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In her article Environmental Justice, Human Rights and the Global South,
Professor Carmen Gonzalez expertly ties together very complex, and often
controversial, strands of international law: the history of international law with its
colonial underpinnings, the North-South divide, and environmental justice. She
discusses their interaction through the lens of “environmental human rights.”
The article is divided into four parts: Part I defines “environmental justice” and
Part II examines the colonial roots of environmental injustice. Part III analyzes
the role of international law in justifying the conquest of nature and of nonEuropean peoples; and Part IV identifies the limitations of the environmental
human rights discourse as a means of addressing environmental injustice. The
writer concludes that although “the discourse of human rights possesses
tremendous emancipatory potential, . . . human rights law and institutions are
embedded in power relations that replicate colonial discourses (such as the saviorsavage narrative) and enable Northern states and transnational corporations to
evade responsibility for their abuse of nature and of vulnerable states and
peoples.”1
While the leading cause of global environmental degradation is the decadent
consumption of resources by the wealthiest inhabitants, Professor Gonzalez points
out that, by contrast, the adverse impacts of such degradation are borne
disproportionately by the planet’s most vulnerable populations in both the North
and the South.2 Environmental justice struggles that take place in both groups are
hindered by asymmetrical power balances in the global community that have roots
in the imperial legacy of international law.3
With decolonization after the Second World War, the composition of the UN
became South-heavy, which led to the adoption of several principles that had a
definite Southern flavor to them: self-determination, permanent sovereignty over
natural resources, the right to development, and differential treatment.4 Some of
these principles have now become part of hard law governing environmental
issues. Yet, their adoption was fraught with controversy, as was the common
heritage of mankind principle, which was promoted by Southern states to ensure
that they benefit from the resources of the global commons despite the lack of
sophisticated technology to exploit these resources themselves.
Professor Gonzalez also challenges “the saviors” (the Northern states and their
NGOs) and “the savages” (the Southern states) narrative of human rights, which
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she contends does not take into account Northern states’ complicity in relation to
conflicts in the South or the benefits that Northern states and transnational
corporations derived from these conflicts.5 She stresses the need for the human
rights discourse to address the deeper structural inequities that produce
environmental injustice. While the environmental human rights discourse holds
promise for subordinated communities, the paper cautions about the drawbacks of
the present human rights system: (a) false universalism that masks Northern
domination; (b) failure to hold Northern states and transnational corporations
responsible for human rights abuses in the South; (c) the challenge of collective
human rights; (d) lack of redress for systemic harms; (e) treating symptoms rather
than root causes; and (f) disregarding local conceptions of human dignity.6
The breadth and the depth of the issues covered in the article are truly
astounding. It not only identifies the drawbacks of the present system, but also
offers solutions to overcome them. The paper is a significant contribution to the
existing literature on environmental justice, “environmental human rights,” the
North-South divide, and the colonial discourse. I am honored to have been
afforded the opportunity to suggest a few comments on the paper, some of which
can form the basis of a new research agenda.
First, the author discusses “environmental human rights” as a means of
addressing environmental injustice, yet the term “environmental human rights”7
does not have a universally accepted meaning under international law. The nexus
between the environment and human rights has been articulated by scholars in
various ways—environmental rights,8 environmental procedural rights,9 a
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Id. at 170, 173-75.
Id. at 173-93.
See Roda Mushkat, Contextualizing Environmental Human Rights: A Relativist Perspective, 26
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 119 (2009) (noting that environmental human rights are inextricably linked
to environmental justice and using the term "environmental human rights" in multiple ways—
extending human rights principles into the environmental realm, the narrow sense (anthropocentric rights) and a more broader sense (ecological rights)).
See Michael Anderson, Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection: An Overview, in
HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 1 (Alan E. Boyle & Michael R. Anderson eds., 1996); Alan Boyle, Human Rights or Environmental Rights? A Reassessment, 18
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 471 (2007) (noting that there are three approaches to the nexus between
human rights and the environment (using existing human rights to seek redress for environmental issues; using procedural rights; and recognition of a substantive right to a clean environment)).
For a discussion of the emergence of a right to environment under international law, see Sumudu
Atapattu, The Right to a Healthy Life or the Right to Die Polluted?: The Emergence of a Human
Right to a Healthy Environment under International Law, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 65 (2002).
For a discussion of these various terms, see Michael Burger, Bi-Polar and Polycentric Approaches
to Human Rights and the Environment, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 371 (2003) and Dinah Shelton,
Human Rights and the Environment: What Specific Environmental Rights Have Been Recognized?, 35 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 129 (2006).
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substantive right to a healthy environment,10 and using existing human rights to
include environmental issues.11 Some refer to “greening” human rights as
environmental human rights,12 while others refer to procedural rights as
environmental human rights.13 Yet others refer to a substantive right to a healthy
environment as environmental human rights.14 Legally, there is a considerable
difference between these terms. The most commonly used rights in litigation are
environmental procedural rights—access to information, participation in the
decision-making process, and access to remedies.15 They are part of international
human rights law and crept into the environmental rights discourse through the
environmental impact assessment process under national law.16 They are now
codified in the 1998 Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental
Matters17—the first time that these rights were explicitly recognized in hard law in
relation to environmental issues. Although a regional treaty, it allows accession by
any UN member with the consent of the Meeting of Parties.18 Interestingly, the
Aarhus Convention makes a clear link between procedural rights and a
substantive right to a healthy environment:
In order to contribute to the protection of the right of every person
of present and future generations to live in an environment
adequate to his or her health and well-being, each Party shall
guarantee the rights of access to information, public participation
in decision-making, and access to justice in environmental matters
in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.19
A related issue is the inter-generational equity principle, a cardinal principle of
international environmental law. While the paper addresses intra-generational
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See Boyle, supra note 8.
See Karrie Wolfe, Greening the International Human Rights Sphere? Environmental Rights and
the Draft Declaration of Principles on Human Rights and the Environment, 9 APPEAL: REV. OF
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See Boyle, supra note 8.
It is generally accepted that contemporary international law does not recognize such a right. See
Atapattu, supra note 8.
These are also referred to as access rights. See THE ACCESS INITIATIVE,
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ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT: PROCESS, SUBSTANCE AND INTEGRATION 23-53 (2008).
See Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, June 25, 1998, 38 I.L.M. 51, available at
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf.
Id. at art. 19.
Id. at art. 1.
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equity and the ecological debt that Northern states owe towards Southern states in
some detail, the current generation has created an even greater ecological debt
towards future generations,20 essentially locking them in a cycle of environmental
degradation and catastrophic weather events caused by climate change. This is
closely related to the profligate consumption of resources that the paper refers to.21
Northern states’ path of unsustainable development has led to the current state of
environmental degradation with some states even facing the prospect of extinction
together with their culture, territory, and population. This is the future that
awaits the Small Island States and is another example of Northern domination not
just of the present generation but of many generations into the future.
Secondly, the paper highlights an important development—the adoption of
rights of nature as embodied in the constitution of Ecuador.22 One of the criticisms
of the rights discourse, as the paper itself recognizes, is that it is inherently
anthropocentric.
The emerging trend toward recognizing rights of nature
irrespective of its worth to human beings—a feature of international
environmental law23 and of ancient civilizations and indigenous cultures—is an
important development. However, because these rights are new, it is not clear
what their parameters are, who can bring a claim, what the remedies are, and
whether the current human rights paradigm can even accommodate such rights.
Thirdly, the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights24 (so-called
Ruggie principles) would have been insightful for the section on the need to hold
multinational corporations accountable for their environmental/human rights
violations. These guiding principles provide a useful framework, albeit nonbinding, for imposing obligations on states to ensure that transnational
corporations abide by certain core environmental and human rights standards.
Despite criticisms25 these guiding principles may at a later date form the
foundation for hard law, as many soft law instruments in the environmental field
have done.
20.
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Gonzalez, supra note 1, at 163.
Id. at 154.
Id. at 186.
For the ecocentric approach to environmental issues, see World Charter for Nature, G.A. Res.
37/7, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/7 (Oct. 28, 1982), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/37/
a37r007.htm.
U.N. Human Rights Council, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing
the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, Rep. of the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other
Business Enterprises, 17th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011), available at
http://www.businesshumanrights.org/media/documents/ruggie/ruggie-guiding-principles-21-mar2011.pdf.
See Penelope Simon, International Law’s Invisible Hand and the Future of Corporate Accountability for Violations of Human Rights, 3 J. OF HUM. RTS. & ENV’T 5 (2012).
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The language of rights is powerful. It focuses attention on victims. It awards
remedies. Thus, it is no wonder that everybody is scrambling to use the rights
framework, whether that framework is suited to his or her claim or not. While the
human rights framework is ill suited for many environmental issues,26 it has been
a useful tool to seek redress for victims of environmental damage. Even if it
obscures “the historic inequities that gave rise to anti-colonial struggles, the NorthSouth divide, and environmental injustice within and between nations,”27 it has
been able to hold perpetrators accountable for their wrongdoings, to award redress
to victims and to deter future damage, even if it is on a micro, individual level.28 In
this sense, human rights have played an important role in relation to
environmental issues. The cracks in the human rights framework are visible
because we have tried to apply an existing framework to a regime that was not
intended for it. We have pulled and pushed at the seams of the human rights
framework to accommodate environmental issues, and to some extent this has
worked. Until international law recognizes a substantive human right to a healthy
environment, the struggle to fit environmental issues within the existing
framework of human rights will continue. As Professor Gonzalez correctly points
out, without addressing the underlying historic inequities, the current inequalities
that have roots in the colonial history, and the disproportionate burden that
marginalized communities bear in relation to global environmental problems, the
human rights paradigm will not be able to effectively address environmental
injustices in the world today.
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The pros and cons of using the human rights framework for environmental issues have been discussed by many writers. See Gonzalez, supra note 1, at 172-73.
Id. at 173.
The main reason for the individualistic nature of the European Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence is the court’s use of Article 8 of the Convention on the rights to privacy and family life as the
basis for vindicating environmental rights. See DAVID HUNTER, JAMES SALZMAN & DURWOOD
ZAELKE, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 1331 (4th ed. 2011).

